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ABSTRACT 
Several states have enacted statutes to protect minors from 
harmful or obscene materials disseminated over the Internet, as 
well as from pedophiles seeking to use the Internet to lure them into 
sexual conduct.  State and federal courts have diverged in their 
analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s impact on state 
regulation in these areas.  While state courts have held that the 
Dormant Commerce Clause does not invalidate state luring 
statutes, federal courts have been consistent in finding state 
dissemination statutes unconstitutional.   This iBrief summarizes 
recent state and federal jurisprudence in this area and concludes 
that state courts have not been successful in distinguishing state 
luring statutes from federal case law on state dissemination 
statutes.  Therefore, state courts have prematurely aborted the 
Dormant Commerce Clause examination. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Of the estimated 10 million children who regularly used the Internet 
in 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice reported that one in five received a 
“sexual approach or solicitation” while online and one in four had “an 
unwanted exposure” to graphic sexual images.2  In pursuit of the important 
goal of protecting such minors, several states have enacted criminal 
prohibitions against the “[d]issemination of material [of a sexual nature] 
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, 2006, Duke University School of Law; B.S. in Accounting and 
B.S. in Business Information Systems, 2001, Villa Julie College.  The author 
would like to thank Professor Erwin Chemerinsky for his guidance in writing 
this iBrief. 
2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, OVC BULLETIN: 
INTERNET CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN (2001) at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/internet_2_2001/welcome.h
tml (last visited March 27, 2005). 
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that is harmful to a minor by computer”3 over the Internet and against use of 
the Internet to communicate with minors with the intent to seduce them.4  
Such statutes, known respectively as dissemination statues and luring 
statutes, have come under constitutional attack as violations of both the First 
Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause.  This iBrief examines the 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to these state laws.   
¶2 California Associate Justice Alex C. McDonald was among the first 
to note the divergent treatment of Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to 
these statutes in federal and state courts.5  With one exception, all reported 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state dissemination statutes have 
occurred in federal courts and all such statutes have been declared 
unconstitutional.6  Conversely, all reported Dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges to state luring statutes have occurred in state courts and such 
statutes have been found constitutional.7  Since Justice McDonald’s 
                                                     
3 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999). 
4 See, e.g., State v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. 2000).  Dissemination 
statutes essentially target sexually explicit materials on the Internet, prohibiting 
such things as text, images, video, and other communication which a particular 
state has deemed harmful or obscene from reaching that state’s minors. See, e.g., 
Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  Luring 
statutes generally aim at criminalizing the conduct of pedophiles who use the 
Internet to seek out and entice minors.  See, e.g., Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 127-28.  
An example of the differences between the two types of statutes can be seen by 
comparing the New York dissemination and luring statutes challenged in Am. 
Library Ass’n and Foley, respectively.  These statutes essentially mirrored each 
other in requiring that a person (1) know the “character and content” of his 
communication (2) which depicts sexual content “harmful to minors” (3) and 
“intentionally use[] any computer communication system” to (4) “initiate or 
engage in such communication with a person who is a minor.”  See NY CLS 
Penal § 235.21 (2005); NY CLS Penal §235.22 (2005).  However, the New 
York luring statute contains an additional requirement that a person, for personal 
benefit, “importunes, invites or induces” a minor to participate in some type of 
sexual intercourse, contact, or performance.  NY CLS Penal § 235.22.  The state 
courts see a distinction between criminalizing a person’s communication of and 
a minor’s subsequent access of harmful material under a dissemination statute 
and criminalizing such communication and access when a person also has the 
purpose of seducing a minor.  See, e.g., Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 453, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
5 See Alex C. McDonald, Dissemination of Harmful Matter to Minors Over the 
Internet, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 163, 165 (Fall 2001).  See also Hatch, 94 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478 (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
6 See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 183.  But see Simmons v. State, 
886 So. 2d 399, 401, 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting a Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge to both a Florida dissemination statute and a 
Florida luring statute). 
7 See, e.g., Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 126. 
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observation, several state and federal courts, including the United States 
Courts of Appeal for the Second and Fourth Circuits, have further 
entrenched their respective positions regarding the Dormant Commerce 
Clause and state regulation of the Internet.   
¶3 The procedure by which these cases come into court may shed 
some light on the lack of federal court review of state luring statutes and the 
lack of state court review of state dissemination statutes.  Generally, 
because the dissemination cases have resulted from preemptive requests for 
injunctions from a multitude of interested parties seeking to protect their 
speech, these parties had the initial choice of forum.8  On the other hand, the 
state luring cases have resulted from challenges brought by criminal 
defendants charged with or convicted of violating the law, thereby dictating 
a state court forum.9  Thus, plaintiffs challenging dissemination statutes 
have been able to fight them on friendly ground in federal court, whereas 
constitutional challenges to luring statutes come from criminal defendants 
forced into state court, where they are tainted by the vulgarity of the crimes 
they are accused of having committed. 
¶4 In finding the state luring statutes constitutional, state courts have 
attempted to distinguish these statutes from state dissemination statutes that 
the federal courts have found unconstitutional.  Whether state dissemination 
statutes or state luring statutes are, in fact, constitutional under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause is not addressed in this iBrief.  Rather, this iBrief asserts 
that by failing to consider varying state standards of what constitutes 
prohibited conduct and who is considered a minor, state courts have not 
been successful in distinguishing state luring statutes from the federal 
dissemination cases.  Consequently, state courts have too easily found “no 
legitimate economic impact” and have therefore prematurely aborted the 
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.  
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. The Genesis and Development of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
¶5 The Constitution gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”10  This power is 
typically referred to as Congress’ Commerce Clause power.  Underlying 
                                                     
8 See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th 
Cir. 1999). 
9 See, e.g., Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 126.  Such cases may still come under federal 
court review through the Supreme Court’s discretionary review or upon federal 
Habeas Corpus review, but to date neither avenue has resulted in a reported 
opinion. 
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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this grant of power was a desire to avoid the economic “Balkanization” of 
the national economy by the states and to recognize “the importance of the 
federal government being able to act in areas that affected the economic 
well being of the nation as a whole.”11  In Gibbons v. Ogden,12 the United 
States Supreme Court first articulated the principle that the Commerce 
Clause contained a dormant aspect which limits the states’ power to 
legislate.13  Even without Congressional action, this dormant aspect implies 
that states may not discriminate against or unduly burden interstate 
commerce.14  Despite this implied limitation, the Court has recognized on 
many occasions that the states still retained many of their traditional police 
powers. 15  Thus, where Congress has not regulated commerce, “courts are 
left to balance the need for laws that allow commerce to freely occur 
between the states against the power of the states to regulate matters that 
affect the health, safety, and security of their citizens.”16 
¶6 In the years since Gibbons, the Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence has gone through several iterations as the Court has attempted 
to articulate what differentiates permitted and prohibited state regulation.17  
The Court’s current jurisprudence has distinguished between those state 
laws that plainly discriminate against interstate commerce and those state 
laws that, while neutral, impose a burden upon interstate commerce.18  Laws 
that discriminate against “out-of-staters” and which represent a form of 
                                                     
11 Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information 
Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L.191, 208-09 (2003) (citing S. 
Cent. Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984); Quill Corp. v. N. 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992)). 
12 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
13 See, e.g., Michelle Armond, Note, Regulating Conduct on the Internet: State 
Internet Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 379, 380 (2003).  
14 Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 788 (2001). 
15 Loudenslager, supra note 11, at 209 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 
151 (1986); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949); 
Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 271 (1875); New York v. Miln, 36 
U.S. (10 Pet.) 102, 133 (1837)). 
16 Id. at 209-10 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-37 (1989); H.P. 
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949); S. Pac. Co. v. 
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945)). 
17 Peter C. Felmly, Comment, Beyond the Reach of States: The Dormant 
Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the Concerns of 
Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 472-75 (2003) (explaining the “local-national 
scheme” and the “direct-indirect analysis” once used by the Court). 
18 See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Authority, 476 
U.S. 573, 579 (1986). 
2005 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 8 
economic protectionism are at the core of prohibited state regulation, 
commanding the strictest level of scrutiny.19 
B. Facially Neutral Laws Under the Dormant Commerce Clause 
¶7 State laws that do not discriminate against nonresidents may still 
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Three lines of analysis are 
presently used by the courts to evaluate the constitutionality of these 
statutes.  The Court’s current test, first articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., balances the local benefits provided by the law against the burdens it 
imposes upon interstate commerce:20   
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.  
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one 
of degree.  And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of 
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on 
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate 
activities.21
¶8 However, Dormant Commerce Clause analysis of a state law does 
not end with the Pike test.  The Court has also “invalidate[d] state 
legislation on the ground that it regulates extraterritorially.”22  In Healy v. 
The Beer Inst., the Court articulated a three-prong analysis to determine 
whether a state law regulates outside the state’s borders: 
First, the ‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state 
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s 
borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State’ . . . 
.  Second, a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly 
outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the 
enacting State’s authority and is invalid regardless of whether the 
statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature. . . .  
Third, the practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by 
considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by 
considering how the challenged statue may interact with the legitimate 
                                                     
19 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 14, at 788 (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987)). 
20 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
21 Felmly, supra note 17, at 482 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 ) (internal 
citations omitted). 
22 See, e.g., Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-40 (1989) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s prior extraterritoriality jurisprudence). 
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regulatory regimes of other states and what effect would arise if not 
one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation.23
¶9 Finally, many of the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause decisions 
have invalidated state statutes that potentially subject an area of interstate 
commerce to inconsistent state regulation.24  Some courts have cited these 
cases in decisions concerning state regulation of the Internet, asserting that 
“certain areas of regulation are so integral to interstate commerce that they 
require the uniformity throughout the country that only federal legislation 
can provide.”25  But while the Supreme Court has invalidated some state 
statutes concerning highways and railways based upon inconsistent state 
regulation, it has done so while showing deference to the important safety 
function of such statutes, noting that “[t]hese safety measures carry a strong 
presumption of validity when challenged in court.”26  The Court has 
emphasized the “peculiarly local nature of [the] subject of safety, and ha[s] 
upheld state statutes applicable alike to interstate and intrastate commerce, 
despite the fact that they may have an impact on interstate commerce.”27 
¶10 Of the three lines of analysis described above, the Pike balancing 
test is the most clearly articulated by the Court.  Some commentators 
believe that extraterritorial effect and inconsistent state legislation are 
merely facets of the Pike balancing test, where the burdens upon interstate 
commerce are still weighed against the local benefits provided.28  Others 
have treated extraterritorial effect and inconsistent state legislation as 
separate and distinct tests from Pike balancing.29  As will be shown below, 
courts evaluating the constitutionality of state dissemination and luring 
statutes have usually either adopted the latter opinion or have not addressed 
the issue at all. 
                                                     
23 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336-37. 
24 See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 526-27, 529-530 
(1959) (striking down a state highway regulation); S. Pac. Co. v. Sullivan, 325 
U.S. 761, 779-82 (1945) (striking down a state railroad regulation). 
25 Loudenslager, supra note 11, at 219 (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union v. 
Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. 
Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
26 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 524, 530.  See also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 
434 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1978).  
27 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 523. 
28 See, e.g., Armond, supra note 13, at 381. 
29 See, e.g., Loudenslager, supra note 11, at 215 (stating that exterritorial effect 
is a per se Commerce Clause violation). 
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II. THE FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS ON STATE DISSEMINATION 
STATUTES 
A. American Library Association v. Pataki 
¶11 The leading federal dissemination case is American Library 
Association v. Pataki,30 which concerned a Dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge to a New York dissemination statute.31  The court held that the 
statute was unconstitutional because (1) it impermissibly gave New York 
jurisdiction over conduct occurring wholly outside of the state, (2) the 
burdens on interstate commerce exceeded any local benefit, and (3) 
legislation of this sort potentially subjects Internet users to a multitude of 
inconsistent state regulations.  Before reaching these conclusions, however, 
the court made a series of observations and findings of fact relevant to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause discussion. 
¶12 The court first noted that Internet users are currently unable to 
discern facts relevant to determining whether they are violating the statute, 
such as the “age and geographic location” of those they communicate 
with.32  According to the court, the Internet was “designed to ignore rather 
than document geographic location” and “no aspect of the Internet can 
feasibly be closed off to users from another state.”33  Even e-mail 
communication between two residents of the same state “may well pass 
through a number of states en route” to its destination.34  Furthermore, 
Internet features like packet switching35 and catching36 increase the 
Internet’s lack of geographic boundaries.37  Lacking an explicit restriction to 
intrastate communications, “the [statute] applies to any communication, 
intrastate and interstate,” that falls within New York’s criminal 
jurisdiction.38  Because the Internet “serves as [a] conduit[]” for many 
different types of commercial transactions, the court reasoned that the 
                                                     
30 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  See PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 167 F. 
Supp. 2d 878, 891 (W.D. Va. 2001), aff’d, 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting 
that Pataki is the leading case in this area). 
31 Id. at 163 (evaluating N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 1999)). 
32 Id. at 167. 
33 Id. at 170-71. 
34 Id. at 171. 
35 Method of routing messages over the Internet in smaller packets.  These 
packets are routed over different paths due to the amount of Internet traffic.  Id.  
36 “Practice of storing partial or complete duplicates of materials from frequently 
accessed sites to avoid repeatedly requesting copies from the original server.”  
Id. 
37 See id. 
38 Id. at 169-70. 
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Internet, like railroads and highways, “represents an instrument of interstate 
commerce.”39 
¶13 Based upon those findings, the court held that the New York statute 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause in three ways.40  First, “the 
[dissemination statute] represents an unconstitutional projection of New 
York law into conduct that occurs wholly outside New York.”41  Because 
Internet users who wish to communicate with the public are unable to 
exclude New Yorkers from such communication, they are necessarily faced 
with the prospect of falling under the statute’s jurisdiction.42  This may 
cause otherwise legal conduct in the user’s location to be subject “to 
prosecution in New York and thus subordinate the user’s home state’s 
policy – perhaps favoring freedom of expression over a more protective 
stance – to New York’s local concerns.”43  Accordingly, the court held that 
the statute unconstitutionally regulated in an extraterritorial manner. 
¶14 Second, the court reasoned that “although protecting children from 
indecent material is a legitimate and indisputably worthy subject of state 
legislation, the burdens on interstate commerce resulting from the [statute] 
clearly exceed any local benefit derived from it.”44  In defining the local 
benefit, the court noted that the statute could not prevent the dissemination 
of harmful materials from international sources and that there would be 
“practical difficulties” with prosecuting domestic violators “whose only 
contact with New York occurs via the Internet.”45  Noting that New York 
had other existing laws intended to protect minors from similar evils, the 
court stated that the benefit “is therefore confined to that narrow class of 
cases that does not fit within the parameters of any other law.”46   
¶15 Balanced against this relatively minor benefit was the “extreme 
burden on interstate commerce” resulting from the statute’s global reach, its 
“chilling effect” on Internet users, “the broad range of Internet 
communications potentially affected by the [statute],” and the excessive 
“costs associated with Internet users’ attempts to comply with the terms of 
the defenses that the [statute] provides.”47  The court therefore held that the 
                                                     
39 Id. at 173. 
40 Id. at 169. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 177. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 169. 
45 Id. at 178. 
46 Id. at 179. 
47 Id. at 179-80. 
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statute struck an unconstitutional balance, finding the burdens “severe” and 
the benefits “attenuated.”48  
¶16 Finally, the court felt the Internet should be an area of commerce 
that is “marked off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent 
legislation that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze development of 
the Internet altogether.”49  Internet users, lacking an ability to wall off a 
certain state’s residents, could potentially fall under the regulation of all 
states.50  The court therefore reasoned that “[r]egulation by any single state 
can only result in chaos, because at least some states will likely enact laws 
subjecting Internet users to conflicting obligations.”51  Hence, even identical 
statutes would leave individuals “subject to discordant responsibilities” 
because there are no national standards on what constitutes harmful 
materials.52   
¶17 Thus, Pataki invalidated the New York dissemination law on all 
three grounds which the Supreme Court has established as the basis for 
Dormant Commerce Clause violations:  as an excessive burden on 
commerce with little local benefit, as an impermissible extraterritorial 
regulation, and as a regulation introducing the possibility for inconsistent 
legislation.  
B. Subsequent Federal Cases 
¶18 A number of federal circuit and district courts have since 
considered the constitutionality of dissemination statutes and many have 
adopted the reasoning in Pataki.  For example, the Tenth Circuit in ACLU v. 
Johnson53 held, following Pataki, that a New Mexico statute represented an 
unconstitutional extraterritorial projection of state policy, an impermissible 
balance of the local benefits derived versus the burdens imposed on 
interstate commerce, and an imposition of “inconsistent state regulation” on 
an area that requires national regulation.54  In Cyberspace Communications, 
Inc. v. Engler, the Sixth Circuit also adopted Pataki in declaring that a 
Michigan dissemination law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause as an 
unconstitutional projection of Michigan policy beyond its borders.55 
                                                     
48 Id. at 181. 
49 Id. at 169. 
50 See id. at 183. 
51 Id. at 181. 
52 Id. at 182. 
53 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999). 
54 Id. at 1160-61 (evaluating N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A)). 
55 Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d. 827, 830-31 
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (evaluating MICH. COMP. LAWS § 772.675 (2002)).  The 
court in Engler did not address either the inconsistent state regulation of the 
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¶19 The Second Circuit in American Booksellers Foundation v. Dean 
held that a Vermont dissemination statute similarly represented an 
impermissible projection of state policy.56  The court specifically stated that 
the Internet’s lack of “geographic boundaries” makes it “difficult, if not 
impossible, for a state to regulate internet activities without ‘projecting its 
legislation into other States.’”57  However, the court did note that “the 
extraterritorial effects of internet regulations differ from [traditional] 
extraterritorial-regulation cases ” in that “internet commerce does not quite 
‘occur wholly outside [Vermont’s] borders.’”58  But the court also noted 
that “at the same time that the internet’s geographic reach increases 
Vermont’s interest in regulating out-of-state conduct, it makes state 
regulation impracticable.”59  Agreeing with Pataki, the court viewed the 
Internet as likely to “soon be seen as falling within the class of subjects that 
are protected from State regulation because they ‘imperatively demand[] a 
single uniform rule,’” but did not hold the statute unconstitutional 
specifically on that basis.60     
¶20 In the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the court 
in Southeastern Booksellers Association v. McMaster recognized that a 
South Carolina dissemination law “arguably violate[d] the Commerce 
Clause in at least two ways: (1) it constitute[d] an unreasonable and undue 
burden on interstate and foreign commerce; and (2) it subject[ed] interstate 
use of the Internet to inconsistent state regulation.”61   
¶21 The Fourth Circuit in PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman invalidated a 
Virginia dissemination statute as a violation of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause based upon a balance of benefits and burdens under the Pike test.62  
As the Second Circuit did in Dean, the court here noted that the Internet’s 
                                                                                                                       
Internet or the impermissible balance of benefits versus burdens prongs of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.  See id.  Those prongs, however, were 
addressed in a prior proceeding concerning the granting of a preliminary 
injunction against the statute.  See Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 
55 F. Supp. 2d. 737, 752 (E.D. Mich. 1999), aff’d and remanded by, 238 F.3d 
420 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting the burdens of the law outweighed the benefits and 
statutes of this type “would subject the Internet to inconsistent regulations across 
the nation”). 
56 Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (evaluating 
13 V.S.A. § 2802 (1998)). 
57 Id. at 103 (quoting Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 334 (1989)). 
58 Id. (quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 332). 
59 Id. at 104. 
60 Id., (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852)). 
61 Southeast Booksellers Ass’n v. McMaster, 282 F. Supp. 2d 389, 396 (D.S.C. 
2003). 
62 PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 240 (4th Cir. 2004) (evaluating VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-391 (Michie Supp. 1999) (amended 2000)). 
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nature made a construction of the statute amenable to the extraterritorial 
projection analysis “nearly impossible.”63 
¶22 Together, these cases spanning five federal circuits represent the 
current federal jurisprudence on Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to 
state dissemination statutes.  Such state statutes have been held to be either 
one or all of the following: an impermissible burden under the Pike 
balancing test, an unconstitutional projection of state policy 
extraterritorially, and an inappropriate subjection of interstate commerce to 
inconsistent state regulation.   
III. THE STATE COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING STATE LURING 
STATUTES 
A. New York 
¶23 The New York Court of Appeals was the first state court to consider 
whether the Dormant Commerce Clause is a barrier to state luring statutes, 
and specifically whether such statutes “unduly burden interstate trade.”64  
Even though both dissemination and luring statutes could be characterized 
as regulating the Internet, the court in State v. Foley held that the New York 
luring statute did “not discriminate against or burden interstate trade; it 
regulate[d] the conduct of individuals who intend to use the Internet to 
endanger the welfare of children.”65  In distinguishing Pataki, the court 
found the luring prong of the statute “a significant and distinct feature.”66  
The court was “hard pressed to ascertain any legitimate commerce that is 
derived from the intentional transmission of sexually graphic images to 
minors for the purpose of luring them into sexual activity” and noted that 
the conduct prohibited by the statute “is of the sort that deserves no 
‘economic’ protection.”67   
B. California 
¶24 Hatch v. Superior Court68 represents a more thorough analysis of 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state luring statutes.  In reference 
to Pataki’s assertion that the Internet requires national regulation, the court 
                                                     
63 Id. 
64 State v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 132 (N.Y. 2000).  
65 Id. (evaluating N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22 (McKinney 1999)).  
66 Id. at 126. 
67 Id. at 133.  In a subsequent case later that year, a New York appellate court 
overturned a lower court’s ruling that the same statute violated the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, citing Foley as precedent.  State v. Barrows, 709 N.Y.S.2d 
573, 574-75 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
68 Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
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distinguish the California law, stating that rather than criminalizing Internet 
access or mandating communication tailored to specific jurisdictions, the 
statute merely proscribed certain communication when coupled with the 
purpose of seducing minors.69  The argument that the communication may 
be interstate in nature cannot “be employed .  .  . to insulate pedophiles from 
prosecution simply by reason of their usage of modern technology.”70  The 
court refused to consider the Pataki analysis controlling, finding “the intent 
to seduce element . . . a distinction of the utmost significance.”71  The court 
reasoned: 
While a ban on the simple communication of certain materials may 
interfere with an adult’s legitimate rights, a ban on communication of 
specified matter to a minor for purposes of seduction can only affect 
the rights of the very narrow class of adults who intend to engage in 
sex with minors.  We have found no case which gives such intentions 
or the communications employed in realizing them protection under 
the dormant commerce clause.72
¶25 Concerning the claim that the statute projected California law 
extraterritorially, the court reasoned that state criminal jurisdiction extends 
to a person who commits any portion of a crime in-state and that such a 
person is punishable as if the crime were committed wholly in-state.73  
Additionally, the court stated that “there is no reason to suppose California 
would attempt to impose its policies on other states . . . for wholly 
extraterritorial offenses” and that “there is no reason at all to assume 
California prosecutors will attempt to stifle interstate commerce by filing 
charges for acts committed in other jurisdictions, or where only ‘de 
minimis’ acts . . . are committed within this state.”74  Based upon this 
reasoning, the court concluded that Pataki’s assumption concerning the 
extraterritorial projection of state law is “without relevance to [the court’s] 
consideration of the statutes.”75 
¶26 The same California statute was again challenged in People v. 
Hsu.76  The court in Hsu stated that while the “Internet is undeniably an 
incident of interstate commerce,” an interstate burden does not necessarily 
follow from Internet regulation.77  In considering the Pike balancing test, the 
court noted difficulty in conceiving what “legitimate commerce [could] be 
                                                     
69 Id. at 471 (evaluating CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.2 (West 1999)). 
70 Id. (emphasis in original). 
71 Id. at 471-72. (emphasis in original). 
72 Id. at 472.  (emphasis in original). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 472-73.  
75 Id. at 473. 
76 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
77 Id. at 190. 
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burdened” and concluded that any burden on interstate commerce “is 
incidental at best and far outweighed by the state’s abiding interest in 
preventing harm to minors.”78  Regarding a claim of inconsistent regulation, 
the court stated that the knowledge requirement as to a person’s status as a 
minor and the requirement of “intent to arouse the prurient interest of the 
sender and/or minor and with the intent to seduce the minor” was sufficient 
to distinguish the California statute from the statute in Pataki because such 
a limited proscription does not burden interstate commerce.79  The court 
adopted Hatch’s reasoning that when the luring statute “is harmonized with 
the entire California penal scheme, it does not effectively regulate activities 
beyond California.”80  Together, Hatch and Hsu represent California’s 
rejection of Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to its state luring 
statute.81  
¶27 Beginning in 2003, the courts of North Dakota, Ohio, and Florida 
reported decisions rejecting Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to their 
states’ luring statutes.82  These states, along with New York and California, 
represent the current state court jurisprudence regarding Dormant 
                                                     
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 191 (emphasis in original). 
80 Id. 
81 Both decisions were followed by a more recent, unpublished California state 
court decision, but no significant analysis was added.  See People v. Hayne, 
2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 2650, at *22-28 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2002). 
82 The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Foley and Hsu concerning the 
lack of legitimate commerce contained within the range of activities prohibited 
by the state’s luring statute because of the luring element.  State v. Backlund, 
672 N.W.2d 431, 438 (N.D. 2003).  In State v. Snyder, an Ohio appellate court 
concluded that the state’s luring statute was constitutional because it was ”a 
valid exercise of police power” that is “narrowly tailored to serve the interest of 
the State in promoting the welfare of children.”  801 N.E.2d 876, 886 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2003), appeal denied, 807 N.E.2d 367 (Ohio 2004).  Three additional Ohio 
state courts examined Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to Ohio’s luring 
statute, but none of the cases engaged in analysis of any additional significance.  
See State v. Cunningham, 808 N.E.2d 488, 493-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), appeal 
denied, 814 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio 2004); State v. Bolden, C.A. Case No. 19943, 
2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2061, at *19-22 (Ohio Ct. App. May 7, 2004); State v. 
Anthony, Appeal No. C-030510, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 3514, at *14-17 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Jul. 23, 2004), appeal allowed, 104 Ohio St. 3d 1408 (Ohio 2004).  A 
Florida appellate court relied upon a lack of legitimate commerce burdened 
under the Pike test and the narrowing effect of the element of intentional 
seduction under the inconsistent burden test in holding the statute constitutional 
under both analyses.  Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2004), reh’g denied, No. 1D02-4638, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 11358 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. Jun. 1, 2004). 
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Commerce Clause challenges to state luring statutes.83  Foley, Hatch, and 
Hsu were decisive in establishing state precedent and subsequent cases have 
been consistent in following the reasoning they established.  Because 
subsequent state courts have been so uniform in following the reasoning of 
these three seminal cases, they have effectively ceased any further Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis of state luring statutes. 
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE STATE COURTS’ REASONING IN 
DISTINGUISHING FEDERAL PRECEDENT 
A. Pike Balancing of Local Benefits Against Burdens Upon Interstate 
Commerce 
¶28 The state courts generally see the intent element of state luring 
statutes as a crucial distinguishing factor in upholding their constitutionality 
and distinguishing them from state dissemination statutes.84  Claiming that a 
requirement of an intent to seduce minors dramatically reduces the potential 
range of prohibited conduct, the state courts assert that what residual 
conduct remains cannot be characterized as legitimate commerce.85  
Therefore, any incidental effect on interstate commerce is inconsequential 
when compared with the legitimate state policy of protecting minors.86   
¶29 However, the state courts have overstated their position when 
contending that no legitimate commerce is burdened, as states may have 
                                                     
83 Two additional state court cases are worth noting.  A Florida appellate court in 
Simmons v. State, 886 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), is the only reported 
opinion by a state court regarding a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a 
state dissemination statute.  Because a “violator who is not in Florida must know 
or believe that he or she is transmitting harmful material to a Florida minor,” the 
court held that the statute did not “subject[] interstate use of the Internet to 
inconsistent state regulation.”  Id. at 406.  The court stated that “Congress 
specifically provides for preemption of state law when it desires” and that there 
was no argument made that the statute “is contrary to any federal law or that 
federal law so thoroughly occupies the legislative field as to require a reasonable 
inference that Congress left no room for it to be supplemented by state law.”  Id. 
at 406-07.  But the court’s discussion of direct conflict and preemption are 
confusing as each are distinct constitutional limitations upon the ability of the 
states to regulate and the absence of conflict or preemption should not have an 
effect upon a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.  In State v. Ansari, a Utah 
appellate court also considered a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the 
state’s luring statute, but that court declined review of the challenge for standing 
reasons without reaching the merits of the challenge.  100 P.3d 231, 241-42 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
84 See, e.g., State v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 126 (N.Y. 2000). 
85 See, e.g., People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
86 See, e.g., id. 
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different policies on what conduct is prohibited.87  One commentator noted 
that 
in many states a nineteen-year-old male may have sexual relations 
with a sixteen-year-old female without violating any law. . . .  
Moreover, a recent comprehensive survey of the laws in varying states 
demonstrates the diversity of age of consent laws throughout the 
country.  There is not criminal liability for sexual conduct with 
children fourteen or older in Hawaii or for sexual conduct with 
children fifteen years old or older in Colorado. 88
¶30 Variance in age of consent laws implies that conduct that is legal in 
one state might be illegal in another state.89  Hence a blanket assertion that 
no burden is imposed upon legitimate commerce by a state luring statute 
that regulates conduct on the Internet oversimplifies the analysis because it 
fails to recognize the Internet’s global reach and the inability of Internet 
users to prevent their communications from reaching a certain state. 
¶31 Additionally, the state courts’ definition of the local benefit derived 
from a state luring statute requires refinement.  Generally, such benefit is 
stated as the protection of minors on the Internet from pedophiles.90  While 
such a purpose is clearly legitimate and of central concern to the states, this 
merely begins the analysis of the local benefit.  The existence of other state 
laws that provide a similar benefit must also be considered.  As noted by the 
court in Pataki in its analysis of the New York dissemination statute,  
The Act is, of course, not the only law in New York’s statute books 
designed to protect children against sexual exploitation.  The State is 
able to protect children through vigorous enforcement of the existing 
laws criminalizing obscenity and child pornography. . . . The local 
benefit to be derived from the challenged section of the statute is 
therefore confined to that narrow class of cases that does not fit within 
the parameters of any other law.91
¶32 The local benefit derived from state luring statutes should thus be 
confined to the same narrow class of cases described in Pataki.  If a luring 
statute is merely redundant, providing the same level of protection or 
deterrence provided by other existing state laws that do not affect interstate 
                                                     
87 See McDonald, supra note 5, at 217. 
88 Id. 
89 See id. at 216-17. 
90 See, e.g., State v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 126 (N.Y. 2000). 
91 Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  In 
discussing the benefit, the court did note that the plaintiffs were not challenging 
the New York luring statute.  Id.  But that statement was made in regard to 
excluding the conduct prohibited by that statute from the measurement of the 
local benefit.  Id. 
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commerce, then the benefit of the law is nonexistent and almost any burden 
upon interstate commerce would be difficult to justify.   
B. Extraterritorial Effect 
¶33 The state courts that have addressed the extraterritorial effects of 
state luring statutes have rejected this challenge to their constitutionality for 
two reasons: either (1) consideration of the state luring statute in 
conjunction with the state’s criminal jurisdiction statutes leads to the 
conclusion that the state’s criminal jurisdiction extends only to conduct 
which has sufficient connections with the state and therefore no wholly 
extraterritorial conduct is ever affected, or (2) no legitimate commerce is 
affected and therefore there is no extraterritorial effect. 92   
¶34 The assertion that no legitimate commerce is affected was rejected 
above.  As to the argument that “harmonization” of a state luring statute 
with state criminal jurisdiction statutes effectively insulates the luring 
statutes from review under the extraterritorial aspect of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause,93 this misses the point the federal courts make in their 
extraterritorial analysis of state dissemination statutes.   
¶35 The federal courts’ main concern regarding extraterritorial 
regulation is that an Internet user engaging in activity legal in his or her 
home state faces the prospect of inadvertently subjecting himself or herself 
to criminal liability in another state.  For example, even though California 
may lack the power to, and disclaims any intent to, regulate wholly 
extraterritorial conduct under the it’s luring statute, an Internet user is not 
able to exclude California residents from his communications, is not able to 
prevent communications not directed at  California residents from passing 
through California because of the design of the Internet, and is not able to 
ascertain another Internet user’s age and geography unless that information 
is truthfully volunteered.94  This leaves an Internet user whose conduct is 
criminal under California’s luring statute but legal in his or her home state 
to be faced with the Hobson’s choice of either forgoing conduct acceptable 
in his home state or exposing himself to possible criminal liability in 
California.95  It is this dilemma that the federal courts in the state 
dissemination cases have uniformly declared a projection of state policy 
extraterritorially in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 96 
                                                     
92 See, e.g., Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 472-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000). 
93 See id.; People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  
94 See Am. Library Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 167, 170-71. 
95 See id. at 180 (describing the exposure of individuals to a Hobson’s choice). 
96 See id.  
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C. Inconsistent State Regulation 
¶36 The California state courts are unique in having directly addressed 
the question of whether a state luring statute unconstitutionally subjects 
interstate commerce to inconsistent state legislation.97  In examining the 
constitutionality of California’s luring statute, these courts reasoned that the 
statute limits the scope of prohibited conduct to a “ban on communication 
of specified matter to a minor for purposes of seduction.”98  Citing an 
inability to “conceive of any legitimate commerce” which may be derived 
from such conduct, the California courts concluded that there is no burden 
upon interstate commerce and hence no threat of inconsistent state 
legislation.99   
¶37 But as noted above, this is a questionable determination and cannot 
be used to avoid the analysis of whether such laws potentially subject 
interstate commerce to inconsistent state legislation.  What California may 
deem illegitimate, another state may find legitimate, whether based upon 
different age of consent laws or different definitions of prohibited conduct.  
Conversely, some conduct permitted by California under their luring statute 
and that may be the subject of legitimate commerce in California, other 
states may find illegitimate.  If “not one, but many or every, State adopted” 
legislation similar to California’s luring statute, the result might be that the 
Internet becomes awash in a flood of inconsistent state regulation.100 
CONCLUSION 
¶38 The federal and state courts that have examined the ability of states 
to regulate, for the purpose of protecting minors, sexually explicit 
communication conducted on the Internet have reached seemingly divergent 
conclusions.  State courts have claimed that certain aspects of state luring 
statutes distinguish these laws from the state dissemination statutes 
evaluated by the federal courts.  Though the state courts’ ultimate 
conclusions as to the constitutionality of state luring statutes may prove to 
be correct, the reasoning used to distinguish these statutes from the federal 
dissemination cases is inadequate.  They have failed to properly consider 
the implications raised by the variance among states regarding the scope of 
prohibited conduct and defining who constitutes a minor on the Pike 
balancing of local benefits against burdens on interstate commerce, the 
extraterritorial effects of the luring statutes, and the specter of an 
inconsistent patchwork of state Internet regulation.  Consequently, the state 
                                                     
97 See Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471-72; Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191-92.  
98 Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis in original).  
See also Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191-92. 
99 Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472-73; Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191. 
100 Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
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courts evaluating luring statutes must delve further into the Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis then they have been thus far willing to do. 
